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ABSTRACT 
 
Any economic system will certainly be influenced in 
institutions and rules by the underlying political system. 
While the political processes are not carried out in the 
market, it can influence economic decisions related to 
consumption, saving, investment and exchange in no small 
way. Through the political processes, the shape of markets 
is formed, the taxation system is setup and government 
budget is determined. In addition, the political processes 
directly influence economic policies, including fiscal, 
monetary, trade and development policies, especially in the 
ways are formed and implemented. 
The analysis of the Islamic political system through the use 
of economic methodology is rare. It is common to provide 
historical analysis based on the experience of “Saqifah(t) 
Bani Saad” with the selection of the first Caliph Abu Bakr, 
as well as the method used to select the three following 
Caliph. This would involve a great deal of textual evidence 
and their interpretation. This paper presents an alternative 
approach to draw the main features of the Islamic political 
system from the basic Islamic values as well as 
contemporary human experiences. We start with identifying 
the most important Islamic values related to the field of 
politics, and set the salient features of a configuration of a 
contemporary political system that would fulfill such values. 
The first section deals with Islamic political values and in 
particular, those related to Tawheed, which we define it to 
be something more than just monotheism. In addition, we 
draw from contemporary Muslem literature the Islamic 
constitutional values. The second section discusses how 
Maqassed (ultimate objectives) of Shari'ah are related to the 
political system. The third section discusses economic 
theory of social choice. The fourth section discusses the 
sources of political failure and how they can be confronted. 
The fifth section discusses the choice between types of 
government. The sixth section discusses the lessons to be 
learnt from the government of Madinah. Finally, in the last 
section, a blueprint for an Islamic economic system is 
presented. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Any economic system will certainly be influenced in 
institutions and rules by the underlying political system. 
While the political processes are not carried out in the 
market, it can influence economic decisions related to 
consumption, saving, investment and exchange in no small 
way. Through the political processes, the shape of markets 
is formed, the taxation system is setup and government 
budget is determined. In addition, the political processes 
directly influence economic policies, including fiscal, 
monetary, trade and development policies, especially in the 
ways are formed and implemented. 
The analysis of the Islamic political system through the use 
of economic methodology is rare. It is common to provide 
historical analysis based on the experience of “Saqifah(t) 
Bani Saad” with the selection of the first Caliph Abu Bakr, 
as well as the method used to select the three following 
Caliph. This would involve a great deal of textual evidence 
and their interpretation. This paper presents an alternative 
approach to draw the main features of the Islamic political 
system from the basic Islamic values as well as 
contemporary human experiences. We start with identifying 
the most important Islamic values related to the field of 
politics, and set the salient features of a configuration of a 
contemporary political system that would fulfill such values. 
The first section deals with Islamic political values and in 
particular, those related to Tawheed, which we define it to 
be something more than just monotheism. In addition, we 
draw from contemporary Muslem literature the Islamic 
constitutional values. The second section discusses how 
Maqassed (ultimate objectives) of Shari'ah are related to the 
political system. The third section discusses economic 
theory of social choice. The fourth section discusses the 
sources of political failure and how they can be confronted. 
The fifth section discusses the choice between types of 
government. The sixth section discusses the lessons to be 
learnt from the government of Madinah. Finally, in the last 
section, a blueprint for an Islamic economic system is 
presented. 
ISLAMIC POLITICAL VALUES 
BASIC VALUES 
Political systems reflect the values generally taken for 
granted by most people living in a society. To identify such 
values in an Islamic society, the basic beliefs in Islam must 
be consulted. 
I. TAWHEED AS A SOURCE OF VALUES 
Islam, perceives God through the concept of Tawheed, which 
literally means belief in the absolute unity and universality 
of God. Tawheed is different from monotheism. Monotheism 
can be interpreted as the belief in one supreme god. 
However, there might me other deities or objects of love and 
or fear of secondary importance to him.  For example, being 
convinced that someone or something has a special 
relationship to God, warranting divinity, like holy men, 
saints, sages, etc. This is disallowed in Islam. Islam 
perceives God through His 99 attributes or names describing 
the most exalted qualities of excellence. Many of them 
indicate that He is beyond any physical structure.  
Tawheed also implies the universality of God. In other words, 
God is the only divine authority in the universe. He is not 
only for Muslems, but he is God to everyone and everything. 
The universality side of Tawheed cannot be overemphasized. 
He cherishes all creation, without exception. His criteria of 
judgement are also general, as all are equally judged by their 
deeds and his mercy. 
A corollary of the unity of God is the unity of the universe, 
as one well-sculptured structure created and managed by 
one God. The unity of God directly leads to the unity of 
humanity, which implies the equality of human beings 
regardless of their sex, color or ethnic origin. People have 
originated from one source, namely clay, and born from one 
father namely Adam. Since all people are the creatures of 
God, and since God is just, people are equal in rights and 
obligations. Justice here is not an obligation to God but His 
choice. God can be unjust, but he prohibits injustice on both 
himself and humankind.  
This creed reigns supreme in Islam. Muslems should not 
espouse any value or action that contradicts the creed of 
God’s unity or Tawheed1. The opposite of Tawheed is Sherk, 
which means belief in multiple gods, multiplicity in the 
godhead or assigning partners to God, like saints. The least 
of Sherk is manifested in the belief in (sometimes infallible) 
saints, with powers and miracles. It also includes one’s belief 
that some being, human or non-human, can bring benefit or 
impose harm. 
Therefore, the unity of humanity is an important corollary of 
the belief in the unity of God. Should one believe that 
                                                 
1 There are two notable exceptions. First is the belief of Sufis in sainthood and in the divinity of 
prophets and their descendants. Second is the belief among some popular versions of the Shi’a 
sect in divinity and sainthood of some of the descendants of Prophet Mohammad. Generally, 
strict adherence of Tawheed depends on education and cultural influences. 
humanity is divided in different classes with some more 
favored than others, this is tantamount to disbelief in 
Tawheed. 
Monotheism common in Judaism and Christianity lacks the 
concept of universality that is present in the concept of 
Tawheed. 
II. ISLAM VERSUS NON-MUSLEMS 
In Islam, Al-Thimma system has run its course in a world 
where religion and nationality were not distinguishable.  It 
is a minority citizenship model, based on differential rights 
and responsibilities and communal autonomy for minorities 
within a state with Muslim majority. As the world has moved 
towards the national state, a new concept of citizenship has 
become altogether necessary.  
A more inclusive definition of national community based on 
the concept of Mowatana, or equal citizenship opened the 
door for an emerging theory of Islamic Citizenship (Warren 
and Gilmore, 2012). Al-Qaradawi (1985, 1997, 2008) and 
others are leading the development of the Fiqh of citizenship 
that upholds equal civil and political rights for non-
Muslems. Such new Fiqh is a radical switch from the system 
of al-Thimma to a system in which non Muslems would enjoy 
equal rights and responsibilities with Muslems, particularly 
in the political arena. This carries special importance, since 
Islam prescribes its own political system, whose features 
resemble in many but not all aspects, modern democracy. 
III. MAN’S MISSION ON EARTH 
The three revealed religions explicitly define man’s mission 
on earth, namely Judaism, Christianity and Islam. In Judeo-
Christian traditions, Adam and Eve lived in heavens in 
prosperity. After they committed the original sin, they were 
banished to earth to toil and face a rough life as a prelude to 
death and then final judgment. Banishment to earth can be 
considered as group punishment to humanity for the 
original sin of their parents. The concept of redemption 
becomes a necessary result of such perception. 
In Islam, this story has been told with a slightly but 
significantly different twist. Man was sent with his spouse to 
the Garden on earth, where material requirements are freely 
available, but temptation and the possibility as well as the 
ability to err are present. The two parents of humanity face 
such possibilities and make their own decision. Having been 
trained into decision making, they descend to earth to 
implement what they have been taught. The concept of the 
original sin is conspicuously absent from Islamic teaching. 
Mankind has not therefore been banished from heaven as 
punishment, but has been privileged with powers and 
responsibilities in a limited sphere, and will be judged on 
how he/she used such privileges, then rewarded with 
eternal life in Paradise or in Hell.   
Having powers with responsibility implies that God created 
man and woman as his vicegerent   on earth. This concept, 
called Istikhlaf, khelafa or Vicegerency implies that people 
were created with dignity, freedom and power in addition to 
responsibility and accountability. Vicegerency is a general 
authorization of all people. It implies freedom with 
responsibility and accountability. This is the most important 
Islamic value that is applicable to politics. 
IV. FREEDOM AS THE ULTIMATE VALUE 
Islam teaches that God created man to act as his vicegerent 
on earth, endowed with abilities, resources and freedom. 
Such endowment is a source as well as a proof of man’s 
dignity. His life is sanctified to the extent that whoever kills 
one person is equivalent to killing all humankind, and 
whoever protects one person’s life is equivalent to giving life 
to all humankind. This is summarized by Umar ibn Al-
Khattab, the second Caliph in his saying “How dare you 
enslave people whose mothers have delivered them free.”2 
Such freedom and dignity is an unalienable right to all 
people, regardless of ethnicity, gender or creed. 
An Islamic political system must therefore protect this basic 
value and make it operative.  
ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES 
I. SHURA 
Shura is simply seeking the experts’ judgement and then 
acting upon it3. This implies that ruling authorities should 
take all decisions and actions, based on the opinions of the 
people of learning, knowledge and experience, distinguishing 
actions that emphasize national interest and actions that go 
against it4. They therefore must implement the actions in 
favor of national interest and abstain from others that run 
against it (Al-ʿAwa, 2006). 
Qur’an prescribes Shura and makes it obligatory. As a 
guarantee against the ruler not applying Shura, Qur’an 
                                                 
2 The statement of Omer was made in connection with a complaint by a Christian Egyptian 
regarding the mistreatment of his son. This emphasizes that freedom is the right of all mankind 
regardless of race or religion. 
3 ﻡﻬﻋﺎﺑﺗﺍ ﻡﺛ ﻱﺃﺭﻟﺍ ﻝﻫﺃ ﺓﺭﻛﺍﺫﻣ 
4 There a distinction between Shura and consultation. The former is an obligation to seek the 
experts’ judgement and then act upon it. The latter is to voluntarily ask for the opinion of others, 
while maintaining the freedom to take it or leave it (Al-Shawe, 1992). 
prescribes the establishment of a group inviting to all that is 
good, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong.  
In addition, Shura is not to be used when there are explicit 
rules, nor should lead to advice against such rules. 
An important tool for practicing Shura is theShura council 
which should represent the whole nation and be chosen out 
of free will by the people. They are considered as agents of 
the people. Therefore, the principal (the people) should be 
entitled to fire them at will. This can be done by presenting 
a case against members whose membership becomes in 
doubt to a special court. Similarly, injustice is prohibited 
and those committing injustice are to be punished. 
II. JUSTICE 
Muslems must observe justice among themselves and 
between Muslems and non-Muslems. 
It is important to emphasize that justice is particularly 
stressed as a value in the political sphere. Generally, when 
permissible actions lead to injustice, they become 
impermissible. The obligation to be just is not limited to 
rulers but covers all citizens in all aspects of life. 
III. LIBERTY 
In the political sphere, liberty means absence of despotism 
and the rights of the ruled to take part in the management 
of their public affairs in a way that is consistent with 
national interest. Liberty also includes freedom of opinion, 
of belief, of education, of ownership and personal freedom. 
Personal freedom includes freedom of movement, right to 
security and right to shelter.  
Since freedom of opinion is the most directly related to the 
political system, Islam stresses the right to choose among 
positions or actions. Liberty is therefore considered as a 
God-given of human nature (Al-‘Awa, 2006). Profits stories 
in the Qur’an highlights their open arguments with their 
people regarding the existence of God and his obedience. In 
addition, several Qur’anic verses and Prophet narrations 
that emphasize freedom of opinion, to the extent that some 
writhers opine that thinking is a religious obligation in 
Islam5. 
The Islamic principle, “There is no compulsion in religion,” 
is a proof of the freedom of speech in Islam. Another proof is 
that Muslems are obliged to exile themselves to protect their 
faith, when their rulers subjugate them with oppression. 
Political freedom is a branch of human liberty. Voicing one’s 
opinion is an obligation rather than a privilege. 
IV. EQUALITY 
In principle, people must have equal rights, liberties, duties 
and public responsibilities, without discrimination, based 
on sex, ethnic origin, language or creed. Such equality is of 
legal and not actual type, meaning that people in the same 
circumstances must be judged by the same rules. That is 
why this principle is called equality under the law. 
Equality has been instituted by Qur’an and the Prophet’s 
traditions. In particular, the prophet said: “Your God is one; 
your father is one; the red are not preferred to the black, nor 
the Arabs to non-Arabs, except in piety.” The tie between 
human equality and Tawheed (the absolute unity of God) 
                                                 
5 Abbas Mahmoud Al-‘Aqqad presents this argument in his book, Thinking As an Islamic Duty, 
quoted by Al-‘Awa, 2006. 
must be noted as important. Equality has not exceptions. 
Piety would be a criterion only on the day of judgement and 
not in this life. 
V. RULERS’ ACCOUNTABILITY 
The people have the right to make their rulers accountable, 
based on their obligation to enjoin what is good and to forbid 
what is bad, as well as their right to Shura. In addition, this 
is supported by several Qur’anic verses and Prophetic 
narrations; it is also supported by the prophet’s narrations 
that decree obedience of rulers as long as they obey God and 
abstention from their obedience when they disobey God.  
Both the first and second Calif demanded that he would be 
corrected by the people should he err. Such is not just 
rhetoric but a solid obligation that should be applied in 
heart, by tongue and then by action. Scholars of several 
schools of thought agree to impeach and depose the ruler 
who violates the rules of Shari'ah. Abdul Hameed Bin 
Badiss, the Algerian Scholar formulated some rules with 
regard to Muslem rulers: 
1. No one should assume the office of the ruler without the 
consent of the people. 
2. Once appointed by the people, no office bearer should be 
held above the people. 
3. Since people are the source of all authority and are 
entitled to appoint and impeach their rulers, they have the 
right to control them. 
4. The people have the right to discuss policies with their 
rules and to force them to accept people’s opinion rather 
than their own. 
5. The State must present to the people its plan and policies 
to discuss and approve. Once approved, they become 
mandatory. 
6. People have the right to choose the ruling laws, as this 
represents their right to sovereignty.  
7. People are equal under the law. 
8. Both the people and their rulers must get used to the 
perception that they are partners in ruling the country, 
and each has its own role to play. 
MAQASSED AL SHARI'AH & POLITICS 
Maqassed al Shari'ah, or the objectives of Shari'ah are 
summary headlines that sum up the Islamic values in all 
aspects of life. Because of their central importance in Fiqh, 
we will attempt to draw the relevant political values from 
each.  
I. PROTECTION OF FAITH 
As mentioned above, Tawheed is the central creed and the 
supreme source of all values. Protection of faith implies that 
all state powers must not act in contrary with Tawheed or 
the values drawn therefrom. The following values can 
therefore be highlighted: 
1. Rulers are public servants of the people, they should not 
raise themselves to a higher rank, or seek being adored by 
the public. 
2. Rulers must avoid treatments through any means that 
would endow them with a divine image. 
3. Rulers must practice Islamic teachings individually and 
socially, in order to set an example of obedience and piety 
to God.  
II. PROTECTION OF LIFE 
1. Protection of human life as well as human rights must 
reign supreme.  
2. Rulers are directly responsible for protecting human life. 
3. Capital punishment must be safeguarded with the 
strictest safeguards and multilayered reviews.  
III. PROTECTION OF PROGENY 
1. Human rights start with humans before their conception. 
This includes rights to life,  
2. The State must take full responsibility for providing health 
and education. 
3. When citizens establish Awqaf to provide education and 
health services, it must be done under socially accepted 
standards, approved by society. 
4. The government must observe in exploiting natural 
resources, taxation and finance the interests of future 
generations. 
IV. PROTECTION OF INTELLECT 
1. Leading members of the three branches of government 
must possess the highest level of intellectual excellence 
that would enable them to better serve their society. 
2. Efforts must be exerted to eradicate illiteracy in all forms, 
and to encourage citizens to develop their intellectual 
faculties. 
V. PROTECTION OF PROPERTY 
1. Private property must be protected. 
2. The rights to own homes, productive assets and develop 
one’s human capital must be fulfilled. 
3. Markets must be organized as competitive outlets where 
well-informed citizens can freely exchange. 
4. Production and exchange of lawful commodities must be 
facilitated by a suitable infrastructure and a legal system 
that protects people’s right to the fruit of their own efforts. 
5. Economic and financial transactions must be carried out 
without Reba (trading present for future money at a 
premium), Ghabn (cheating) and Gharar (risk trading) 
ECONOMIC THEORY & SOCIAL CHOICE 
I. THE IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM 
Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem (1950) show that 
decisions about “the general welfare” are either impossible 
or have to be left to a dictator. It is based on five axioms each 
appears to be reasonable by itself, in addition to being 
morally desirable and befitting general welfare. He also 
formulated the problem in general terms so that it concerns 
choices on goods or people. Subsequently, he derived a 
contradiction. The Theorem forms the core of books in 
welfare economics. 
II. MODERN CRITIQUE 
Colignatus (2011) rejects the theorem on two bases. First, 
while the mathematical structure is valid, under its axioms, 
it must be interpreted with reasonableness and moral 
desirability. Second, the theorem application is rather static, 
while reality is dynamic. Colignatus claims that by 
considering the role of time a greater scope for morality, and 
more attractive voting procedures can be found. 
Colignatus (2011) claims that the Theorem has had a subtle 
influence on political thought, by justifying skepticism 
regarding the concept of democracy, especially in places in 
doubt how representatives should be elected and turns 
morally desirable rules to be impossible. He adds that the 
explicit influence of the Theorem as it teaches that the 
maximization of a morally acceptable Social Welfare 
Function (SWF) is impossible. 
The impossibility Theorem implies that the constitution that 
people would desire in all countries is an impossible dream. 
Colignatus accepts the mathematical results of the Theorem, 
but rejects its claims concern regarding the domains of 
reasonableness and morality, as unwarranted. In general, he 
claims that the Theorem has inconsistent properties that are 
unreasonable and morally undesirable. In particular, he 
argues that Arrows axiom of Pairwise Decision Making (the 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) to be unrealistic.  
Colignatus emphasizes the difference between voting and 
deciding. He contends that the Axiom of Pairwise Decision 
Making, APDM, excludes vital information about 
preferences. Consequently, it leads to paradoxes and 
inconsistencies. The Axiom is incongruent with the notion of 
group decision making. An individual can exclude 
information about some issues, but a group cannot.  
Colignatus claims that no society would want to accept 
Arrow’s axioms as its constitution. While Arrow adopts 
feasibility, he attempts to impose infeasible conditions. 
Arrow’s axioms must be reasonable and consistent at the 
same time. Colignatus claims that they are inconsistent and 
thus not reasonable. This would negate the impact of the 
Theorem. 
For the axioms, there is the subtle difference between 
reasonable and seemingly reasonable when considered by 
themselves.  Since a paradox is a seeming contradiction, 
there must exist a system that would be acceptable as the 
optimal. The distinction between reasonable and seemingly 
reasonable is often not applied with sufficient care.  
THE IDEAL VOTING SCHEME 
I. TRADITIONAL METHODS 
A. PLURALITY  
the candidate with the highest number is selected. It does 
not imply that the winner must have more than 50% of the 
vote, which would require more rounds of voting, and rules 
for candidates to drop out. 
B. BORDA’S  
Each voter ranks candidates by importance. Each rank 
position has a weight. Weights per candidate are tallied for 
all voters. The candidate with the highest value is selected. 
This method appears sensitive to preference reversal, i.e., 
when the top candidate withdraws, preferences between the 
remaining candidates change. 
C. CONDORCET’S  
To vote on all pairs of candidates, and to select the one who 
wins from all alternatives. If there is no winner, the margins 
of winning are used to solve the deadlock, which increases 
the sensitivity to who participates. 
Colignatus, 2011 gives an example to show that the winning 
candidate depends on the voting method. He discusses the 
possibilities of strategic voting and provides further schemes 
(2001). 
D. BORDA FIXED POINT 
Let us reconsider the dynamic process that occurs within an 
economy. We see that under the influence of time, the 
candidates list changes continuously. A voting scheme 
naturally requires that there is a fixed list of candidates. 
When some candidates withdraw election result face a 
sudden change. A voting procedure would be better if the 
choice is less dependent upon changes in the candidate list. 
A way to achieve this is to use the notion of a fixed point. It 
requires a stronger condition for winning, which is that the 
candidate obtains the highest tally against all others and 
maintains a higher tally against his strongest opponent 
before and after the change in the candidates list. This gives 
the fixed point condition. It appears that this fixed point 
voting procedure reduces the dependence upon changes in 
the candidates list. There can still be a dependence, but it is 
not as large as without the condition. 
II. THE CHOICE OF THE VOTING METHOD 
An election result depends on procedures as of the 
preferences. Accounting for the dependence of morality upon 
time opens the way towards a solution. 
Colignatus provides three important conclusions: 
1. Candidates and issues presented for voting must 
represent an improvement over the status quo. 
Our interpretation of this conclusion is that candidates must 
be better alternatives than incumbents. In addition, 
candidates must be more qualified to judge the issues, as in 
the case of parliament members, better than the average 
citizen. Suppose society members have varied degrees of 
education that ranges from illiteracy at one extreme to PhD’s 
in certain fields. Setting a minimum level of education to 
candidates would be a move towards optimality.  
2. The Borda Fixed Point can be seen as a compromise 
between the Borda and Condorcet procedures (on Paretian 
points), and provides a degree of protection against 
changes in the candidates list. 
3. A proportional parliamentary system would enable its 
members to use the advanced voting procedures to select 
the President. 
The reason behind the last conclusion is that voting 
increases in complexity when the numbers of candidates 
and voters rise. Direct election of a President becomes 
quickly infeasible for the more advanced voting procedures. 
proportional representation removes the conflict between 
the electoral mandate of the President and the Parliament. 
The Borda Fixed Point method, is recommended only for 
single seat elections, and not multi-seat elections.  
POLITICAL EFFICIENCY & FAILURE 
I. POLITICAL EFFICIENCY 
Political efficiency means that political decisions conform to 
the preferences of the population. Since total unanimity may 
not be possible most of the time, some measure of majority 
or “voting rule” must be adopted. This has been discussed in 
the previous section. The society has to start with a 
constitution that defines some of its general preferences and 
insure that the three branches of government conform in 
their daily work to social consent.  
The distinction between simple and special majorities can 
simply be assured through the chosen voting rule, used for 
the choice of government officies. 
We can therefore consider that unanimity, when reached, 
reflects an optimal solution. Alternative voting rules would 
make a second best, provided that the options voted on are 
better that the status quo. 
II. POLITICAL FAILURE 
A political failure occurs when (Besley and Coate, 1998): 
1. Policies chosen by the political process fail to be efficient 
using second-best efficiency as a benchmark.  
2. Resources used to determine policy, fail to produce a 
selection from the second-best Pareto frontier so that, in 
principle, all citizens can be made better off. 
III. SOURCES OF POLITICAL FAILURE 
4. Rent-seeking, lobbying activities and campaign financing 
(Besley and Coate, 2001). 
5. Coordination difficulties among voters to choose between 
competent and incompetent candidates (Besley and 
Coate, 1997). 
6. Improper voting methods (Colignatus, 2011). 
7. Legislative policymaking: failure in the bargaining 
procedure used to make decisions (Weingast, Shepsle, and 
Johnsen, 1981). 
8. Strategic use of policy.  Examples: 
8.1. Running deficits to reduce the policy flexibility of 
future incumbents (Tabellini and Alesina, 1990). 
8.2. Privatization to create a class of stakeholders 
committed to voting in favor of particular kind of 
government (Biais, and Perotti, 2002). 
8.3. Waging wars by one country to benfit other 
countries, e.g., the Gulf War launched by US and UK 
for the benefit of Iran and Israel. 
IV. REMEDY OF POLITICAL FAILURE 
Political failure can be reduced by choosing a failure 
resistant political system through constitutional reform. 
Constitutional and legal reform can be designed to block the 
following possibilities: 
1. Collusion between government and business to establish 
monopolies or provide unjustifiable protectionism, 
2. Closed tenders for government projects instead of open 
competitive tenders in order to prevent collusion, 
3. Establishment of military or totalitarian rule that 
manages the country by command and not by consensus, 
4. Collusion between government and media to control the 
information related to policy decisions. 
Political failure can also be reduced by taking the following 
actions: 
1. Streamlining the political process to reduce the cost of 
coordination among voters, 
2. Increasing competition among information media and 
regulating advertisements, in order to reduce the cost of 
information to voters, 
3. Insuring transparency in political bargaining in order to 
make costlier to carry out secret political deals.  
4. Excluding the military from political and economic 
activities, 
5. Setting maximum limits on the period of services of key 
government positions, 
6. Setting minimum educational requirements for members 
of the legislature. 
7. Appointment of judges of the court by election. 
This implies that political systems are not equally prone to 
political failure. 
FACTORS REDUCING POLITICAL FAILURE 
We can list some of the important factors that reduce 
political failures: 
I. REDISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL POWER 
Ideally, political power should be distributed uniformly 
among population. At least the distribution of political power 
should not lead to biased political decisions in favor of a 
certain minority. Such power distribution is aimed at by 
political systems and sometimes is expressed as “one man 
one vote.” However, this would necessarily imply uniform 
distribution of political power only in a world with zero 
information cost.  
Information is not only costly to obtain, but also costly to 
produce and disseminate. Information is paralleled with 
misinformation. The distinction between both requires 
expertise, i.e., it is costly to distinguish between correct and 
misleading information. Misinformation can be based on 
omission or commission. If some pieces of information are 
neglected while others are disseminated, or when only 
biased information is disseminated, or when no information 
at all is available, people will not be equally informed. 
In addition, political failure would depend upon the voting 
system used to elect public officers. 
We can postulate the following: 
1. Information is a superior good, i.e., its demand rises with 
income. 
2. Demand for information depends on both its price and 
households’ income or wealth. 
3. Political decisions are based on the information made 
available to and the preferences of each citizen. 
4. Those with certain political preferences will attempt to 
block the information that exposes their political 
preferences as untenable or socially unacceptable. 
5. Those who seek information related to political decisions 
will equate the cost and benefit of information at the 
margin. 
6. Information accumulation and dissemination has 
economies of scale. 
The six postulates above can be used to prove the following: 
 The rich will tend to be more informed about political 
decisions than the poor are. 
 Each citizen will attempt to modify the information 
stock that is socially available in a way to justify his/her 
political preferences. 
 For the wealthy, their budget constraint allows them to 
purchase, modify and disseminate more information 
than the poor. 
 In a free market society, the wealthy tend to dominate 
the information market. 
 People with similar preferences will tend to form groups 
to jointly collect and disseminate information favorable 
to their preferences. 
 In a world with interdependent utility functions across 
political borders, people will tend to form groups to 
jointly collect and disseminate information in other 
countries, where political decisions affect them. 
Now two questions must be addressed. First, how to prevent 
the distribution of political power from becoming so skewed 
against the poor. Second, how to correct an already skewed 
power distribution.  
As to the first question, one way to prevent the 
maldistribution of political power is to enforce a uniform 
wealth distribution. Such a solution would be trivial, 
because such enforcement would be inefficient as well as 
inadequate, as market forces would change any income 
distribution initially imposed. 
Another way is to take proper measures that would reduce 
the cost of information to voters, particularly the poor ones. 
In addition, measures can be taken to facilitate the 
establishment of political parties in order to benefit from the 
economies of scale in information collection and 
dissemination. Moreover, democracy rules are to be enforced 
within political parties. In particular, all positions would be 
filled up through elections and time limits imposed on the 
service of office bearers. In addition, high standards of 
transparency in financing political activities would be 
observed. 
Correcting the maldistribution of political power is more 
complicated, as those currently enjoying powerful positions 
would not cede their privileges easily. The solution lies in the 
proper application of political reform, which can be applied 
gradually through an unlikely state of political consensus, 
or forced through constitutional reforms, when such process 
is available in the constitution. When doors are closed for 
political reform, a revolution would be necessary to impose 
the necessary corrections. 
II. BALANCE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT 
BRANCHES 
As independent government branches is a condition for good 
governance, they should remain separate and independent 
without one branch dominating another. The most difficult 
aspect of this requirement is that the executive branch 
usually has more tools to exercise powers than the legislative 
or the judicial branch. 
The powers of the executive branch should be balanced by 
enforcing the rule of law and insuring independence of the 
information media, so that citizens would be sufficiently 
informed regarding the excesses of government. 
In order to sufficiently strengthen the powers of the legal 
branch, certain standards of excellence must be imposed on 
the scholastic qualifications of judges. In addition, the 
choice of judges through elections would strengthen their 
political powers and immune them from the domination of 
the executive branch. 
The legislative political power significantly depends on free 
elections. A representative assembly would be relatively 
weak if it came through rigged elections. Therefore, the 
election processes must be carefully designed and monitored 
by the legal branch, in order to prevent the executive branch 
from rigging elections. 
III. NEUTRALIZING OF THE MILITARY 
The military can turn from a defense force to guard the 
territorial integrity of their country to a political power with 
political and economic interests that it wants to protect for 
its own members. In addition, army officers can take 
advantage of the military industrial complex, MIC.  
When armaments are produced in the private sector, the 
MIC refers to the vested interests within the state and 
industry in expanding the military sector and in increasing 
military spending, with external threats providing the 
justification (Dunne and Sköns, 2009). When armaments 
are produced in the public sector, army officers will find it to 
their advantage to place production under their control. It 
may even expand the armament industry to include non-
defense products. Such expansion will provide more political 
power. Arguments related to national security will be used 
to decrease transparency in what becomes to be the military 
sector. 
At the extreme, the military can have total control of 
political, social and economic life. We have seen the military 
occupying streets, managing enterprises and having 
representatives in every public institution, in order to protect 
its unduly expanded interests. 
Recent experience confirms the tendency of the army in 
certain developing countries to take power in order to protect 
vast economic interests usually associated with rampant 
corruption and sometimes with army dominance of a large 
sector of the economy, including the military industry 
and/or foreign arms purchases. 
Such experiences include cases of Algeria, Iraq and Egypt, 
where military or semi-military governments ruled for 
extended periods. Naturally, military power when reinforced 
by economic power tempts the army to rule the country in 
order to protect the economic privileges of its leadership.  
Some associate the power of the army, especially when 
exercised from behind the scenes with the rise of certain 
political groups favoring fascism and military rule (Marshall, 
2007). This of course would ultimately shift the power to the 
army and pave the way for military coup d’état.  
VI. CHECKS AND BALANCES: 
Checks and balances must be designed a distribution of 
political power to prevent any political arrangement that 
attempts to go against the preferences of the majority.  
A. TRANSPARENCY, 
All institutions in the system must follow rules that reduce 
the cost of obtaining information about their operations to 
the public, and guarantee a continuous flow of information 
that allows the public to make judgments and stop or modify 
any process that contradicts their preferences. 
Rules must be set to provide citizens with the right to obtain 
information, to respond and correct misinformation in the 
media and to refer when necessary to records and 
documentation. 
B. ACCOUNTABILITY, 
Political, social and economic processes must include a 
mechanism that makes the decision maker accountable to 
stakeholders. In addition, accountability at the level of each 
process must be subject to review by a higher echelon in the 
system, in order to insure that no processes contradict social 
preferences. 
C. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, 
Political processes must be open to all interested and 
qualified agents. Entry to all political, economic and social 
processes must be guaranteed to all citizens. The cost of 
entry must be kept sufficiently low to allow all entrants.  
One way to do so is to allow political parties through which 
citizens may exploit information economies of scale to 
further their political goals. Such parties must have proper 
governance. Incentives to parties that reduce their 
information cost should be provided. Finance of political 
campaigns must be closely monitored. 
Each party must be considered a political unit that is 
managed through Shura. Its offices must be filled with 
properly elected officials, who can made accountable 
through periodic elections and time limits to service.  
A system that deteriorates to a one- or two-party system 
would reflect elements of barriers to entry or information 
impediments to entry in the political system.  
THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA 
A free and independent media in a world of costly 
information is a tall order. However, we offer the following 
rules for discussion that would enhance the political role of 
the media: 
I. MEDIA OWNERSHIP  
Public ownership of media should be rejected at the outset. 
Private ownership of media must be organized in such a way 
to prevent media dominated by individuals or interest 
groups. This can be done through the following: 
1. Media market should be a free competitive market with 
no entry barrier. 
2. A maximum limit on aggregate ownership of individuals 
and institutions must be imposed. Five percent could 
be a reasonable limit. 
3. Individuals and institutional shareholders in any media 
business must not have common business interests 
(e.g. shareholders of the same firms or their 
subsidiaries) or sociopolitical interest (e.g., membership 
of the same political party, club, etc.) that could bias or 
tilt the information processes towards a certain 
position. 
4. Freedom of the press must be guaranteed. 
II. MEDIA ACCESSIBILITY 
Information content presented by the media will obviously 
contain news items plus opinions. News items must be 
drawn from credible sources and proven to be correct. People 
and institutions negatively affected by incorrect news items 
published without careful scrutiny of their sources must be 
given equal space to respond. Expression of opinion must be 
opened to all citizens so that no one is barred from 
expressing an opinion or countering another opinion in the 
media. The government must not censure published 
opinions, especially under the guise of protecting national 
security.  
Communication media, based on low cost internet services, 
must be equally accessible to the poor and the rich. This can 
be done through providing low-cost computers and internet 
connections, free internet centers to the poor, where they 
can access news media, and free access to social networks. 
Media workers should not be forced to divulge their news 
sources. However, once a news item is proven to be 
incorrect, the publishing media must place a correction 
taking the same place, space and emphasis as the original 
false item. Justifications for forcing divulgence of news 
sources for reasons of national security must not be used at 
any time. 
Media workers must have immunity with respect to the news 
items and opinions they publish. However, they remain 
responsible for any harm caused to other individuals and 
institutions. Punishment and/or compensation for such 
harm should be limited to fines estimated by court decisions. 
Media workers can be prosecuted for intentionally 
publishing false news as well as for liable. However, such 
claims must be vetted by their peers (for example in their 
union) before going to court. In addition, penalties should be 
limited to fines imposed on media firms. Media workers 
should not be incarcerated for their professional actions. 
Advertising in the media must be prevented from influencing 
the information presented in the media. Media staff 
(reporters, newscasters, writers, editors, etc.) must be 
supervised separately from the media commercial 
department.  Media sources of income must be declared and 
be subject to verification and periodical evaluation. 
Rules governing advertising in media must be made part of 
controlling finance of election campaigns. Activities of 
potential interest groups must be closely monitored and 
regulated in a way that prevents biased media information 
or undue influence of members of some government 
branches.    
WEALTH DISTRIBUTION 
Without ignoring the necessity of equity (social justice) that 
is decreed by Islam, markets will not produce the 
distribution of wealth that keeps a balanced distribution of 
political power. Therefore, a process of redistribution must 
be instilled in the system to be applied each year in order to 
correct the wealth distribution continuously.  
While income and wealth equality is not proposed, citizens 
in each country must be guaranteed basic needs (food, basic 
shelter and basic education) as a first step, followed by the 
level of sufficiency that includes basic needs plus suitable 
housing, health, education, and transportation through a 
reasonable degree of engagement in the economic system 
and redistribution as a supplementary mechanism.  
THE WEALTHY AND THE GOVERNMENT 
In a world with costly information, the wealthy can 
purchase, manufacture and interpret more information than 
the poor can. This provides them with an edge in engaging 
the political system. Wealth redistribution, even when it 
provides for the level of sufficiency may be able to reduce 
this advantage but will not get rid of it completely. 
Additional measures must be taken through constitutional 
and legal edicts to make sure that the application of the rule 
of one-person one-vote is effective. Some of such rules 
include the regulation of campaign funding, the rules of 
establishing and managing political parties as well as the 
education through schools and media regarding the political 
process. In addition, safeguards must be set to prevent 
interest groups from influencing decision makers. 
CHOICES OF GOVERNMENT TYPE 
1. The Western Models of democracy 
1.1. Direct (participatory) democracy, 
1.2. Indirect (representative) democracy, 
2. Socialist totalitarianism 
3. Islamic Shura 
Obviously, the choice should be between democracy and 
Shura. 
I. DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
1. Citizens make proposals and vote on which proposal to 
implement via the voting system of their choice. 
2. Workable only in very small societies, where community 
members are well informed about issues and they know 
each other. 
3. Partially practiced in Switzerland through recurrent use 
of plebiscites. In this case, powerful local government 
units are capable of providing citizens ample opportunities 
to raise and resolve political issues. 
4. In the small-size GCC countries, it is practiced through 
certain traditions, including 
4.1. The size of the population allowed to establish 
States in these countries through an explicit or implicit 
covenants between citizens and the ruling family. 
4.2. In some countries, e.g., Kuwait, the covenant is 
accompanied by a constitution. 
4.3. Rulers holding regular open house (Majless) for the 
public to receive suggestions and complaints. 
4.4. Rulers regularly visit tribal communities and 
provinces to collect information regarding people’s 
opinions and demands. 
4.5. Wide accessibility of rulers and high officials to the 
public and a tradition of courteous response. 
5. However, in small GCC countries, native populations are 
expanding fast. In addition, there is a problem of 
population balance due to the presence of high 
percentages of foreign workers. Perhaps a gradual move 
towards constitutional monarchy is advisable. 
6. Too costly and therefore inefficient for countries with sizes 
that are too large for the efficient practice of direct 
democracy.  
VII. REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
1. Citizens do not exercise their political power directly, but 
through a legislative council,   
2. In the real world, individuals, as such, do not make social 
choices.  They seem limited to choosing “leaders," who 
will, in turn, make social decisions. 
3. Policymakers are selected from the group of citizens who 
present themselves as candidates for public choice,  
4. Candidates are generally associated with political parties, 
each with a platform. This raises several questions that 
are germane to the effectiveness of the political process: 
4.1. The utility function of political candidates 
4.2. Candidates may maximize wealth through political 
power. This type of candidates opens the door for tying 
government to business interests and could increase 
the prevalence of corruption. 
4.3. Another possibility is the candidate maximizing his 
party’s interests. This would be consistent with the 
candidate’s maximizing long-term personal interests in 
terms of wealth and political power. Political parties in 
this case will end up as a club of members with joint 
objectives to be politically powerful. Through such 
power they maximize their own wealth. 
4.4. A political candidate may aim to realize an ideal or 
a vision, with an altruistic motive. In such case, 
political parties will bring together members with 
similar visions in order to work for reaching it. 
Ultimately, through actual practice, ideals and visions 
are gradually reduced to realistic expectations. 
However, as long as they remain the guiding aim for the 
party, the political processes will gain efficiency. 
VIII. THE DEMOCRATIC METHOD:  
1. It is the institutional arrangement for arriving at political 
decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide 
by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote 
(Schumpeter, 1954; Buchanan, 1967). 
2. The voting process should be based on certain rules that 
insure the choice of qualified candidates through free 
competition. Such rules may include: 
2.1. The acceptable age and education level for a 
member of the lower and the higher legislative 
chamber. There should be a differential between the 
minimum age and education for both chambers, as the 
upper chamber would vet decisions by the lower one.   
2.1.1. One example, it should be 21 years of age and 
a first university degree for the lower chamber. 
2.1.2. For the higher chamber, it should be 30 years 
of age with a PhD degree in some specialization. 
2.2. Conditions may be set to exclude people with 
previous relationships with an older presumably 
totalitarian regime from the political process. 
2.3. Rules to exclude candidates who have committed 
certain crimes from the political process. 
POLITICAL PARTIES  
I. POLICY MOTIVATIONS 
1. A political party is defined as a group of people of well-
defined common preferences.  
2. Such preferences are usually manifested in a platform 
that is publicized to help the public make its judgment.  
3. Theories assume either that parties care only about 
winning, or that they have certain political preferences. 
3.1. Parties care only about winning and are willing to 
implement any policy to do so (Brennan and Buchanan, 
1980). 
3.2. The ruling party gravitates to median policy 
preferences. 
3.3. This is a case of non-existent government (Usher, 
Dan, 1994). 
3.4. Parties have policy preferences (Alesina, 1988, 
Wittman, 1983). 
IX. PARTIES AND POLITICAL EXPRESSION 
An individual’s interest in expressing his/her political 
preference has many options: 
1. To express opinion singly, 
2. To form an informal group that works for and publicizes 
certain political preference, 
3. Join a part that comes close to his/her own preferences. 
When an individual expresses his/her political preferences 
singly, it is remotely likely that such preferences will gain 
sufficient support to be implemented. Joining an informal 
group would be a cheaper alternative; as a group can collect 
and disseminate more information regarding its members’ 
preferences. Such an informal group will not be suited to run 
for office and consequently will be unable to implement its 
political preferences. It can only support political candidates 
and form alliances with parties. 
Parties therefore become the only alternative that could be 
useful in directly implementing preferences through their 
reaching office and becoming policymakers. Ironically, this 
advantage in expressing preferences pauses a dilemma to 
voters. Since it is rather unlikely that sociopolitical 
preferences cannot be exhaustively expressed by one or few 
parties.  
Citizens will have to divide themselves into a large number 
of parties without the likelihood that any of them would rule 
by itself.  In such a model, parties will have what we can call 
a “trade off of preferences” in order to form a coalition and 
implement some of the preferences of a party in exchange for 
implementing some of the preferences of another. 
Another equilibrium would be that citizens join a small 
number of parties, as in the two-party system, where they 
do not aspire to fulfilling a significant part of their 
preferences but opt to accept a minimum of a common 
denominator of a big party. The payoff in this case would be 
a better chance to fulfill a common denominator rather than 
a minute chance to fulfill a significant amount of 
preferences. 
X. THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM: EQUITY VS 
EFFICIENCY 
The electoral system can influence political parties, 
government formation as well as voting behavior. Some 
political scientists propose that the electoral system should 
be designed with an eye on fairness and equity, Cincea, 
2013. Naturally, economists would stress efficiency. 
However, electoral systems are usually designed by the 
parties in power, which lends them to be based on 
expediency rather than equity or efficiency. 
Efficiency implies that the political processes result in the 
realization of political preferences of most if not all of the 
society. This can be guaranteed only if competition in the 
political arena is assured, under the assumption of as 
uniform distribution of information as possible.  
I. PLURALITY VOTING SYSTEM 
Only the highest vote getter in an election gains a seat in 
office (winner takes all). Candidates who have a realistic 
chance of winning under such a system are almost always 
associated with a gigantic party, which have a strong 
following among voters and necessary resources, such as 
funding and volunteers to work in campaigns countrywide. 
This system is used  
To a much greater extent than many other electoral 
methods, plurality electoral systems encourage tactical 
voting techniques, like "compromising". Voters are 
pressured to vote for one of the two candidates they predict 
are most likely to win, even if their true preference is neither, 
because a vote for any other candidate will likely be wasted 
and have no impact on the final result. 
In the Tennessee example, if all the voters for Chattanooga 
and Knoxville had instead voted for Nashville, then Nashville 
would have won (with 58% of the vote); this would only have 
been the 3rd choice for those voters, but voting for their 
respective 1st choices (their own cities) actually results in 
their 4th choice (Memphis) being elected. 
The difficulty is sometimes summed up, in an extreme form, 
as "All votes for anyone other than the second place are votes 
for the winner", because by voting for other candidates, they 
have denied those votes to the second place candidate who 
could have won had they received them. It is often claimed 
by United States Democrats that Democrat Al Gore lost the 
2000 Presidential Election to Republican George W. Bush 
because some voters on the left voted for Ralph Nader of the 
Green Party, who exit polls indicated would have preferred 
Gore at 45% to Bush at 27%, with the rest not voting in 
Nader's absence. 
Such a mentality is reflected by elections in Puerto Rico and 
its three principal voter groups: the Independentistas (pro-
independence), the Populares (pro-commonwealth), and the 
Estadistas (pro-statehood). Historically, there has been a 
tendency for Independentista voters to elect Popular 
candidates and policies. This phenomenon is responsible for 
some Popular victories, even though the Estadistas have the 
most voters on the island. It is so widely recognised that the 
Puerto Ricans sometimes call the Independentistas who vote 
for the Populares "melons", because the fruit is green on the 
outside but red on the inside (in reference to the party 
colors). 
Because voters have to predict in advance who the top two 
candidates will be, this can cause significant perturbation to 
the system: 
Substantial power is given to the media. Some voters will 
tend to believe the media's assertions as to who the leading 
contenders are likely to be in the election. Even voters who 
distrust the media will know that other voters do believe the 
media, and therefore those candidates who receive the most 
media attention will nonetheless be the most popular and 
thus most likely to be in one of the top two. 
A newly appointed candidate, who is in fact supported by the 
majority of voters, may be considered (due to the lack of a 
track record) to not be likely to become one of the top two 
candidates; thus, they will receive a reduced number of 
votes, which will then give them a reputation as a low poller 
in future elections, compounding the problem. 
The system may promote votes against more so than votes 
for. In the UK, entire campaigns have been organized with 
the aim of voting against the Conservative party by voting 
either Labor or Liberal Democrat. For example, in a 
constituency held by the Conservatives, with the Liberal 
Democrats as the second-place party and the Labor Party in 
third, Labor supporters might be urged to vote for the Liberal 
Democrat candidate (who has a smaller majority to close and 
more support in the constituency) than their own candidate 
on the basis that Labor supporters would prefer an MP from 
a competing left/liberal party than a Conservative one. 
Similarly, in Labor/Lib Dem marginals where the 
Conservatives are third, Conservative voters may be 
encouraged or tempted to vote Lib Dem to defeat Labor. 
If enough voters use this tactic, the first-past-the-post 
system becomes, effectively, runoff voting—a completely 
different system—where the first round is held in the court 
of public opinion; a good example of this is the Winchester 
by-election, 1997. 
Proponents of other single-winner voting systems argue that 
their proposals would reduce the need for tactical voting and 
reduce the spoiler effect. Examples include the commonly 
used two-round system of runoffs and instant runoff voting, 
along with less tested systems such as approval voting and 
Condorcet methods. 
II. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION (PR) 
PR systems are used in most European democracies. They 
allow multiple parties to flourish. PR systems employ larger, 
multimember districts where five or more members of a 
legislature may be selected in a single election district. Seats 
are distributed according to the proportion of the vote won 
by particular political parties, Amy, 1993.  
II. DYNAMICS OF DEVELOPING POLICY 
PREFERENCES WITHIN EACH PARTY 
Is the “winner takes all” a barrier to entry? This question can 
be answered through examining the issues related to 
political competition. As in the case of all other commodities, 
competition in general makes the production and 
dissemination of information more efficient in terms of 
maximizing the quantity and quality of information 
produced and disseminated. The same rule applies within 
political parties. Competition influences promotes revealing 
preferences and reaching a common denominator in each 
party. 
Competition will also promotes reaching efficient policy 
choices within a party. Parties formed around historical 
figures or managed in a centralized fashion, as in the one-
party political systems will fail to produce efficient political 
choices. 
Political competition within each party is therefore a 
necessary condition. 
Political competition should give rise to efficient policy 
choices.  
Economics does not have a satisfactory theoretical model of 
political competition to investigate such arguments (Becker, 
1985). The reason is the absence of pecuniary measures of 
equilibrium, like prices, or the possibility of imputing them. 
Empirically, in many instances, Western democracy failed to 
produce efficient choices (Wittman, 1989).  
POLITICAL AGENCY MODELS 
 Citizens choose between incumbents and challengers 
(Austen-Smith and Banks, 1989),  
 Political agency arrangement is supposed to throw 
Irresponsible or incompetent incumbents out of office.  
 However, the political agency models fail to identify or 
explain the characteristics of the incumbent or 
challenger.  
 Citizens choose between incumbents and challengers, 
based on their characteristics. There is a need to 
identify which characteristics are considered favorable 
by citizens. 
 Models of political agency do not explicitly identify the 
principal-agency problem and how it is resolved. 
 The models are not altogether helpful for making policy 
predictions. 
MODELS OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
I. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS 
 Candidates are citizens with policy preferences; they 
run for office to influence policy outcomes, rather than 
parties that maximize votes.  
 Citizens weigh up costs and benefits of political 
involvement.  
 Interest groups offer transfers to selected policy makers; 
they try to influence incentives to run for office and 
voter preferences over candidates.  
 Characteristics of incumbents and challengers are 
derived endogenously, and the disciplinary role of 
elections is considered. 
 Dynamics can be introduced. 
II. IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOCRACY MODELS 
 Non-alignment of preferences between legislator and 
society. 
 Alignment requires perfect competition in politics.  
Barriers to entry are bountiful for it is costly to be a 
candidate and run a campaign. 
 Election campaigns are costly and require financing. 
 A candidate must withstand pressures from interest 
groups. Since this is all but possible, candidates align 
themselves with the lobbyist of their choice. This can be 
based on highest bidder in many times. 
PROBLEMS WITH REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
I. THE INCOMPETENT CANDIDATE 
 A good politician (wheeler-dealer) often means an 
individual with sufficient networking and alliances to 
negotiate for political power with others. Networking 
and alliances may reduce the importance of 
competence. It may also make it unnecessary to reach 
an alliance of preferences between the candidate and 
the voters. 
 An incompetent politician does not understand the 
socioeconomic effects of political decisions. His interest 
in reaching satisfactory arrangements with his alliances 
reduce the importance of the socioeconomic 
consequences of policy decisions. Examples of such 
consequences are: 
o The effect on the size and influence of the middle 
class, 
o Distribution of the tax burden among income 
classes, 
o The evolution of the political system itself towards 
more totalitarianism. 
II. INTEREST GROUPS AND LOBBYISTS 
A. AS PART OF THE DECISION PROCESS 
Interest groups are associations of individuals or 
organizations that, based on one or more shared political 
preferences, work together to influence public policy in their 
favor usually by lobbying members of the government or 
carrying out propaganda campaigns to convince voters to be 
inclined towards their preferences. 
Some political scientists regard Interest groups influence on 
policy making as not a corrupt or illegitimate activity per se, 
but a key element of      the      decision-making      process, 
Martini, 2012.  
B. AS A SOURCE OF CORRUPTION 
They instead consider disproportionate and opaque interest 
group influence as a leading factor to administrative 
corruption, undue influence, and state capture, favoring 
particular interest groups at the expense of public interest. 
They, on the one hand, admit the negative effects of interest 
groups on the efficiency of democracy as well as the social 
welfare. However, their concept of disproportionality and 
opaqueness has no quantifiable limits. 
Such school of thought consider transparency as a key to 
ensure that policy-makers do not give preferential treatment 
for specific interest groups. They suggest regulations of 
lobbying, conflict of interest, asset disclosure, competition, 
as well as, on freedom of information to increase 
transparency and accountability in decision making.  
C. INTEREST GROUP REGULATIONS 
Regulation of interest groups could be problematic, as both 
the legislator as well as regulators can be subject to the 
influence of interest groups. Regulation of interest groups 
can be blocked from the start at the legislator’s level. A good 
example of this is the gun lobby in the United States, which 
succeeded to frustrate all efforts aiming to regulate the use 
of personal weapons. In additions, it is not uncommon to see 
that officials of regulatory agencies usually retire into large 
positions in the industries they regulate. 
Paletz et al., 2012, consider interest groups are 
intermediaries linking people to government, and lobbyists 
work for them. The concept of intermediation implies an 
added value to the political process. However, this is an 
empirical question which would stand against the 
hypothesis that democracy could turn into government by 
interest groups and for them too6.  
D. ARE THEY POLITICAL PARTIES? 
Paletz et al., consider that the most important difference 
between interest groups and political parties is that the 
former do not seek elective office. However, such distinction 
does not hold in many cases. In addition, interest groups 
become involved in elections to influence policymakers. They 
may contribute funds, make independent expenditures, 
advocate issues, and mobilize voters. Wealthy groups help 
pay for the presidential nominating conventions and the 
                                                 
6 212 of the 248 members of Congress on committees that investigated the 2002 accounting 
scandals and collapse of the Enron, had received campaign contributions from Enron or its 
accounting firm, Arthur Andersen. Don Van Natta Jr., “Enron’s Collapse: Campaign Finance; 
Enron or Andersen Made Donations to Almost All Their Congressional Investigators,” New 
York Times, January 25, 2002, accessed March 23, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/25/business/enron-s-collapse-campaign-finance-
enron-andersen-made-donations-almost-all-their.html.  
presidential inauguration. Political parties reciprocate 
through adopting laws that comply with the objectives of 
their donors. 
III. PLURALISM THEORY AND COMPETITION 
AMONG INTEREST GROUPS 
A. PRO PLURALISM ARGUMENTS 
Pluralism theory postulates that competition among interest 
groups produces compromise and balance among 
alternative policy preferences. Pluralists consider the 
abundance of interest groups, their competition and their 
representation of interests in society can achieve a desirable 
dispersion of power or at least an acceptable balancing of the 
various interests in society, Dahl (1956), Bentley (1998) and 
Browne (1998). 
Some groups might dominate areas where their interests are 
paramount. However, Pluralists claim that two factors rectify 
this situation.  
 People will find it expedient to belong to several interest 
groups in order to realize a large number of a variety of 
preferences. Such overlapping membership encourages 
negotiation and compromise.  
 Underrepresented people will find it expedient to form 
their own groups to assert their interests. 
B. ANTI-PLURALISM ARGUMENTS 
One may notice that the pro pluralism arguments implicitly 
assume either that organization is not costly or the ability to 
organize (particularly financial) is uniform among all (or at 
least most) citizens. An argument against pluralism is, 
therefore, that people are not equally empowered to benefit 
from the establishment and membership of interest groups. 
In particular, business has an advantage over other groups, 
particularly the poor and the working class. Common citizens 
lack the financial resources and skills to organize. The issues 
that concern them are often absent from the policy agenda, 
Baumgartner et al, 2009.  
“Business sponsors political advertisements, gives campaign contributions, donates to 
political parties, hires law and public relations firms, and funds research advocacy 
groups promoting free-market economics.” “A corporation can deploy multiple lobbyists 
and obtain access to various policymakers by joining several trade groups, belonging to 
business associations such as the US Chamber of Commerce, and using its CEO and 
other personnel from headquarters to lobby,” (Berry et al, 2008 and Paletz et al, 20127). 
Interest groups and lobbyists attempt to take advantage of 
the possibilities of rent sharing with political 
representatives. A common example in economics is that of 
monopolies that are created through legal restrictions on 
market access. Another example when a minority of the 
population has strong preference related to some political 
issue, e.g., foreign policy. The lobbyists will intermediate to 
pass rewards to politicians from the minority. Examples of 
this case have arisen in cases of anti-Cuban and Pro-Israeli 
lobbyists in the United States.  
We can therefore expect that minorities as well as 
businesses would be willing to pay for Potential monopolistic 
arrangements and foreign policy decisions to politicians. 
Rent is often paid by interest groups through the finance of 
political campaigns and other means. Generally, interest 
groups: 
                                                 
7 Business and trade associations make up approximately 70 percent of the organizations 
with representation in Washington, Schlozman and Tierney, 1986. Add interest groups 
representing professionals, and they accounted for approximately 85 percent of total 
spending on lobbying in 1996, Baumgartner, 2009. 
 Pressure legislators for or against certain policies.  
 They represent (active or rich) minorities  
 They try to counteract majority preferences with 
incentives to legislators. 
 The relationship between interest groups and the media 
requires special scrutiny. 
 Interest groups can easily control the most effective 
media, TV, Films and newspapers. 
 EVIDENCE 
o Modest credentials of American and many 
European heads of states and/or prime ministers. 
o The role of lobbyists in American politics. 
o The repeated involvement in unpopular wars by 
some Western countries.  
ISLAMIC POLITICAL SYSTEM 
I. MADINAH CONSTITUTION 
The Madinah Constitution is the document that was written 
as an agreement between the residents of City. It marked the 
establishment of the first Islamic State, and later on has 
been considered as a constitution (Al-Awwa, 2006). We 
summarize its main points in the following. 
A. BASIS FOR MOWATANA OR CITIZENSHIP 
The constitution defines the citizens of the Madina State as 
all residents: Muslems, Jews and Mushreks (idol 
worshippers) with equal rights and obligations. 
B. THE HEAD OF STATE AND THE STATE LAW 
Prophet Mohamed is the Head of State and the law to be 
applied is Islam and the Prophets judgement or 
interpretation.  
C. MAIN PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
1. Equality among citizens 
2. Justice 
3. Disapproval and unrecognition of injustice 
D. THE RIGHT OF OTHERS TO JOIN THE AGREEMENT 
Others are allowed to join the agreement after being signed 
by its original signatories.  
E. PROHIBITION OF UNILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH 
ENEMIES OF THE STATE 
F. NON-POLITICAL PRINCIPLES 
1. Capital punishment for murder, 
2. Prohibition of sheltering of criminals 
3. Punishment is personal, meaning it is specific and 
restricted to the criminal 
II. SAQIFAH EXPERIENCE 
Ansar, or the supporters of the Prophet, who invited him and 
his earlier companions to Madinah, gathered in Saqifah(t) 
Bani Saad, after the passing of the Prophet to consult with 
each other about choosing a new ruler. Later on, they were 
joined by some of the early companions of the Prophet. 
Several opinions were discussed (Awwa, 2006). 
A. THE HEAD OF STATE FROM ANSAR 
Ansar claimed that they are more entitled to occupy the 
position of the Head of State, as they are the supporters of 
the Prophet. 
B. THE HEAD OF STATE FROM QURAYSH 
Abu Bakr, based on an oral tradition of the Prophet claimed 
that the Head of State should be chosen from Quraysh, the 
tribe of the prophet. 
C. DUAL HEAD OF STATE, ONE FROM ANSAR AND 
ANOTHER FROM EARLY COMPANIONS  
The seat of the Head of State should be occupied by two 
persons, one from each group. 
XI. LESSONS FROM SAQIFAH 
1. The experience of Saqifah has some implications, but it 
should not be exaggerated, because, Awwa (2006): 
1.1. Muslems had no political theories developed during 
the time of the prophet, as revelation reigned supreme. 
1.2. No political parties existed, and no distinctive 
political programs were presented. However, Muslems 
are entitled to form political parties, provided that their 
programs comply with Islamic principles and party 
members would not be prejudiced against members of 
other parties.  
1.3. Not all Muslems were represented, i.e., the choice 
of the Khalifa was not an election but merely a 
nomination. 
2. The Islamic State requires a political system. 
3. The continuity of the State requires a ruler that would 
continue the approach of the Prophet. 
4. The choice of the Head of State should be done through 
Shura8.   
5. Islam does not prescribe a specific mechanism to be used 
for exercising Shura. This is obviously left to the 
conditions of time and place. 
6. The right of the nation to choose its rulers through Shura 
does not have to follow the same mechanism applied for 
the choice of early Khalifas, Awwa (2006). The important 
thing is that Shura must be applied through the 
mechanism that Muslems would consider suitable at the 
time.  
7. The practical application of Shura in contemporary times 
is that the people have the right to choose their rules and 
representatives through election, Awwa (2006). 
III. KHELAFA EXPERIENCE 
 Muslems lived under participatory democracy until the 
Fourth Caliph. 
 Until that time, the shape of a representative 
government had not been developed by Shari’ah 
scholars.   
                                                 
8 Some claim that the choice of Abu Bakr, the second Khalifa was not done by Shura, but it 
was merely the choice of Omar, later to be the second Khalifa. This is contrary to what Omar 
himself said, including: the choice of Head of State is by Shura; execute whoever claims the 
top position for himself or others without Shura; kill anyone who appoints himself without 
consenting Muslems. 
 After the Fourth Caliph, the Muslem government 
deteriorated from participatory democracy into a 
monarchy. 
 Muslems spent vast resources trying to reform the 
system through fighting, but the power of the executive 
was too overwhelming.  
IV. POLITICAL THOUGHT AT TIMES OF KHELAFA 
Some interesting political thought has appeared during the 
time of early Khalifas, especially at the time of Uthman the 
third Khalifa. 
A. THE RIGHTS OF QURAYSH TO RULE 
At the times of Uthman the third Khalifa, the opinion that 
the Khalifa should be chosen from Quraysh was challenged 
by several people, Awwa (2006). 
B. ABU THARR OPINIONS ON PUBLIC FINANCE 
Abu Tharr opined that a Muslem should not accumulate 
wealth what exceeds his daily sustenance, except what is 
needed for Jehad or to provide to qualifying guests. Any 
treasure to be kept over and above these three requirements 
would be considered as hoarding punishable by God. Such 
opinion became popular among the poor, who agitated to 
force the rich to follow Abu Tharr’s prescription. Finally, he 
preferred voluntary solitude in a small village close to 
Madinah, where he lived until he passed away, Awwa (2006). 
C. OPINIONS OF ABDULLAH IBN SABA 
Abdullah Ibn Saba was a Jewish convert to Islam (some 
think that he was only pretending). He travelled through 
Muslem countries to spread his opinions against the Khalifa 
Uthman. Some accuse him of forming a secret organization 
to antagonize people against Uthman. He had two important 
opinions: 
 First, the claim of the Prophet’s will, that each Prophet 
wills the rule after him to an heir, and Ali Ibn Abi Taleb 
(the fourth Khalifa) was the Prophet’s legitimate heir. 
Those who assumed the Khalifa position before Ali were 
usurpers. Based on that, he attempted to gather 
opposition against Uthman. 
 Second, he initiated the idea of the “return” which 
started by claiming that the Prophet would return to 
life, then ended by claiming that Ali would return to fill 
the earth justice after it had been filled with injustice. 
The limited similarity of his opinions with those of the 
Shia’ is only accidental and rudimentary as there is no 
relationship between them to start with. 
V. POST KHELAFA POLITICAL THOUGHT  
 Tyranny and oppression prevented Shari’ah scholars 
from saying much about the shape of the Islamic 
government. The Saqifah experience has been: 
 Mostly ignored by most Muslems. Those who stand for 
democracy did not perceive the democratic implications 
of that experience. Those opposed to democracy feared 
that such experience can be used as a proof of the 
existence of an Islamic political system. 
 Attacked by some members of one out of the eight 
schools of thought, who took it as part of their creed to 
limit the choice of the ruler into Ali and his 
descendants. This is particularly interesting, because 
such criticism implies that the choice of rulers should 
be limited to a small subgroup, nullifying the principle 
of Shura and calling for a divine right to rule.   
 Scholars with integrity advised rulers against tyranny 
and encouraged reform, which came to be cosmetic and 
did not touch upon the structure of government. 
 The treatise of Mawardi appeared in the 11th century, 
rather late for the development of an Islamic political 
system.   
 Scholars who wrote about government focused on two 
issues:  
 Imamah, or the choice of the Caliph 
 Hisbah, how to keep social behavior within Shari’ah 
boundaries. 
 There are some political activists, mostly 
fundamentalists, and writers who think that once a 
Caliph is elected, everything else should be fine. This 
appears to be naïve. Some others even call for the 
imposition of a calif by force, which also negates the 
principles of Shura.    
 We must therefore try to extract a modern form of the 
Islamic political system from the spirit of Islam 
embodied in Qur’an and Sunnah, based on the Saqifah 
experience as well as the Sahīfat al-Madina, or the 
constitution of Madina. 
A MODERN STRUCTURE OF AN ISLAMIC POLITICAL 
SYSTEM 
A modest attempt to define the shape of Islamic government 
that synthesizes and draws from numerous writings. 
I. SHURA IN ISLAM 
 Governance Mechanism (ﺔﻳﻌﺟﺭﻣ) to insure that: 
o All legislation is Shari’ah based. 
o All government actions are Shari’ah based.  
 Citizens’ right as well as duty to choose their rulers. 
 Identify the People of Decision (ﺩﻘﻌﻟﺍﻭ ﻝﺣﻟﺍ ﻝﻫﺃ), who are 
most qualified to serve in state branches. 
II. QUALIFICATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVES 
 Religious commitment (piety & trust). This may appear 
to be hard to assess. However, in a political system, it 
is sufficient to find no known behavior of the person in 
question that runs contrary to this criterion. 
 Knowledge, e.g., academic degree in fields of knowledge, 
proper distribution of representatives among different 
fields 
 Experience, like holding certain positions related to 
specialization for a certain period  
 Citizens elect the Head of State from among ( ﻝﺣﻟﺍ ﻝﻫﺃ
ﺩѧѧѧﻘѧѧﻌѧѧﻟﺍﻭ). In this case, all citizens have equal rights to 
choose the ruler, but not everyone has the right to be 
chosen. Choice would be restricted to a subgroup who 
are the people of decision. 
 Citizens elect legislators from among (ﺩﻘﻌﻟﺍﻭ ﻝﺣﻟﺍ ﻝﻫﺃ) 
 Some past practices would indicate that the Head of 
State appoints members of the legal branch of 
government from among the People of Decisions, 
specialized in Shari’ah (with a PhD in Shari’ah/law). 
However, such ancient practice violates the rule of 
Shari'ah and must be replaced by the following 
principle: 
o All citizens Decisions specialized in Shari’ah and 
law and qualified to practice it, elect the members 
of the legal branch, each with a mandate of limited 
period and subject to accountability.  
III. FURTHER REQUIREMENTS 
 Political parties must have platforms, 
 Rules of governance for political parties:  
o Each party must practice Shura within itself, 
o Party platform must be Shari’ah based. 
 Media independence from foreign or local influence, 
 Economic policy that aims at:  
o Basic needs for the poor, 
o Growth, full employment and social justice,  
o Keep market structure Shari’ah compliant. 
 A Reba-free banking and financial system.  
IV. REFINEMENTS 
 Maximum term on head-of-state service. 
 Maximum limit on the incumbency of legislators, 
 Guarantees of civil liberties within the boundaries of 
Shari’ah, 
 Safeguards against corruption and nepotism in the 
executive branch of government, 
We can construct an Islamic political system that would 
avoid the mistakes found in the Western democratic system. 
Whether such system would outperform Western democracy 
is an empirical question. 
Implementing such a system would be a challenge. It would 
not be easy. However, it would be very rewarding. 
INTERDEPENDENCE BETWEEN POLITICS & 
ECONOMICS  
The rules governing the economic system are developed 
through the political process. We can include in such rules: 
1. Rules protecting private property, 
2. Trading rules in markets that prevent monopolies, 
cheating, etc., 
3. Regulations of financial markets and institutions, 
4. Financing of public goods, 
5. Taxation and redistribution, particularly, Zakah and 
Awqaf.  
The system is supposed to contain safeguards that prevent 
collusion between government officials and businesses that 
are rent seeking. The prohibition of Reba, Ghabn and Gharar 
must be legislated and implemented.  
Therefore, the political system influences the economic 
system directly. The economic system defines the economic 
power-base for the state.  Both systems would therefore be 
interdependent. 
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